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ABSTRACT
Within the Integrated Defense Systems of The Boeing Company, aftermarket support of military
aircraft serves as an increasingly large source of revenue. One of the newest contracts between
Boeing and the U.S. Government created such a supply partnership at the Army Rotorcraft
Repair Depot in Corpus Christi, Texas. At this depot, all Army helicopters, including Boeing's
AH-64 Apache Attack helicopter and CH-47 Chinook Cargo helicopter undergo major repair and
overhaul. In 2004, Boeing entered an agreement with the U.S. Government to assume
responsibility of the repair depot's supply chain for aftermarket parts for Boeing rotorcraft.
Over the last two years, Boeing has been creating and refining Corpus Christi's support structure
to ensure that the required repair parts arrive when demanded. In establishing this new supply
chain, Boeing has identified numerous inefficiencies as a result of inaccurate and highly volatile
forecasts. This thesis examines the impact of volatility within the new support structure and
creates flexible solutions to mitigate its negative effects on lead times, multiple sources of supply
and inventory management. Efforts to increase communication flow across the supply chain are
used to capitalize on economies of scale for cost reduction while safety stock recommendations
are made for critical end-items. Monte Carlo simulations are employed to justify and validate the
solutions.
The results of the thesis reveal that a strategic selection of raw material safety stock can reduce
procurement lead times by an average 61% for a subset of parts while maintaining financial
responsibility. Additionally, by leveraging cost reduction techniques, an average increase of 11%
in Boeing's income from sales can be achieved while eliminating inefficient administrative delays
and increasing customer fulfillment rates. These two recommendations demonstrate specific
solutions for mitigating the effects of demand volatility and inaccurate forecasting.
Thesis Advisor: Stephen Graves
Title: Abraham Siegel Professor of Management, Sloan School of Management
Thesis Advisor: Deborah Nightingale
Title: Professor of the Practice, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics and
Engineering Systems Division
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Crystal. Her never-ending love and support continues to
be the source of my strength and motivation. Without her, I would not be the man I am today.
I would like to thank all of the people at Boeing and the CCAD support team who helped make my
internship a success. Specifically, I'd like to thank my company supervisors, David Greenwood
and David Neumeyer. Their guidance, direction and trust made the experience truly educational
and enjoyable. Thanks to Jim Wart for answering my countless questions, providing instant
access to the database and helping me pass the day with great conversation. Without his
assistance, the projects would have never gotten off the ground. Thanks to Tiffany Park for all of
the help on the raw materials project and for making me feel like a member of the team from the
first day. Finally, I'd like to thank Ken Gordon in Engineering for letting me borrow his Monte
Carlo software until my license was purchased. The fixed pricing analysis would have never
been completed on time otherwise.
I'd like to thank my thesis advisors, Professor Deborah Nightingale and Professor Stephen
Graves. Their insight, thoughts and recommendations ensured the success of the internship and
this thesis.
Finally, I'd like to thank the Leaders for Manufacturing Program and the LFM Class of 2007 for
their support during this incredible experience.
NOTE ON PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
In order to protect proprietary Boeing information, the data presented throughout this thesis has
been altered and does not represent the actual values used by The Boeing Company. The dollar
values and markup rates have been disguised, altered or converted to percentages, names have
been changed and part numbers and supplier data have been omitted in order to protect
competitive information.
This page intentionally left blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... 4........
NOTE ON PROPRIETARY INFORMATION ................................................................................... 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................................7
INDEX OF TABLES AND FIGURES ............................................................................................... 9
1.0 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................11
1.1 The Boeing Company.......................................................................................... 12
1.1.1 The AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter ......................................... 12
1.1.2 The CH-47 Chinook Cargo Helicopter ....................................... ........... 13
1.2 The Defense Aerospace Industry: Post September 11, 2001..............................14
1.3 The Corpus Christi Army Depot........................................................................... 17
1.4 Creation of the Supply Chain............................................................................... 18
1.5 Thesis Outline...................................................................................................... 20
2.0 INTEGRATION AND UNDERSTANDING ........................................................................ 21
2.1 Information Flow.................................................................................................. 21
2.2 How Parts Arrive at CCAD................................................................................... 22
2.2.1 Initial Processes...................................................................................... 23
2.2.2 Ordering and Shipping............................................................................ 24
2.3 Process Timelines................................................................................................ 25
2.4 Im plications of Variation on Lead Times..............................................................29
2.5 The Depot Overhaul Factor................................................................................. 31
3.0 EXPLORING FIXED UNIT PRICING ................................................................................ 34
3.1 Risk Due to Quantity Fluctuations........................................................................ 35
3.2 Risk Due to Material Escalation........................................................................... 36
3.3 Data Gathering..................................................................................................... 37
3.3.1 Discussions with the Asset Managers..................................................... 37
3.3.2 Non-CCAD Dem and for Parts.................................................................39
3.4 Data Analysis....................................................................................................... 39
3.4.1 Risk Mitigation from Quantity Fluctuations..............................................40
3.4.2 Revenue Implications of Fixed Unit Pricing............................................42
3.4.3 Recomm ended Exclusion List ................................................................ 45
3.5 Monte Carlo Simulation........................................................................................ 46
3.5.1 Monte Carlo Data Input .......................................................................... 47
3.5.2 Assumptions........................................................................................... 48
3.5.3 Trial Calculations and Process Flow...................................................... 52
3.5.4 Sim ulation Results.................................................................................. 54
4.0 RAW MATERIAL PROCUREMENT POLICY..................................................................57
4.1 Building for Flexibility: The Universal Model........................................................ 58
4.1.1 Data Collection........................................................................................ 59
4.1.2 Assumptions............................................................................................ 60
4.1.3 Trial's Calculations and Process Flow................................................... 62
4.1.4 Financial Implications of Safety Stock....................................................69
4.2 Simulation Recom mendations for Safety Stock................................................... 72
4.3 Centralized Storage for Common Materials......................................................... 74
5.0 METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFYING POOR DEPOT OVERHAUL FACTORS............76
5.1 Disagreement Between Sources......................................................................... 76
5.2 Identifying Focus Areas....................................................................................... 79
5.3 Methodology Insights and Results....................................................................... 81
6.0 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................... 82
6.1 Observations........................................................................................................83
6.2 Recom mendations for Future W ork.....................................................................84
7.0 INDEX OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................... 88
8.0 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 89
INDEX OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1.1: AH-64A Apache and AH-64D Apache Longbow ......................................................... 13
Figure 1.2: CH-47D Chinook Cargo Helicopter..............................................................................14
Figure 2.1: Com m unication Network..............................................................................................22
Table 2.1: Contract Data Exam ple.................................................................................................23
Figure 2.2: Task Com pletion Tim eline...........................................................................................26
Figure 2.3: Supply Chain Variability in Dem and............................................................................28
Figure 2.4: Lead Tim e Analysis.....................................................................................................30
Figure 3.1: Q uantity Fluctuation Risk.............................................................................................35
Figure 3.2: Leveraging Econom ies of Scale..................................................................................38
Figure 3.3: Cost Com parison.........................................................................................................41
Figure 3.4: Sm all Contract Q uantities............................................................................................42
Figure 3.5: Contract Revenue Sensitivity.......................................................................................44
Figure 3.6: Exclusion List Recom m endation..................................................................................45
Figure 3.7: Fixed Unit Pricing M onte Carlo Process Flow Chart....................................................47
Figure 3.8: PERT Distribution........................................................................................................50
Figure 3.9: Experience Curve vs. Q uantity Bands.........................................................................52
Figure 3.10: Dem and Calculations.................................................................................................53
Figure 3.11: Cost and Incom e from Sales Calculations.................................................................54
Figure 3.12: M onte Carlo Sim ulation Results................................................................................55
Figure 4.1: Raw M aterial, Universal M odel Process Flow Chart....................................................58
Figure 4.2: Raw M aterial Classification..........................................................................................62
Figure 4.3: O n-hand Inventory Calculation....................................................................................64
Figure 4.4: O rdering Logic.............................................................................................................66
Figure 4.5: O rdering Logic Calculation........................................................................................68
Figure 4.6: Inventory Policy Com parison......................................................................................68
Figure 4.7: Raw M aterial Cost Exam ple........................................................................................71
Figure 4.8: Safety Stock Recom m endation...................................................................................73
Figure 5.1: DO F Source Analysis..................................................................................................78
Figure 5.2: DO F Volatility Calculation............................................................................................79
Figure 5.3: Detailed DO F Analysis................................................................................................80
This page intentionally left blank
1.0 Introduction
Within the aerospace community, relationships between the manufacturers and
the customers extend well-beyond the initial time of sale. In fact, approximately
two-thirds of the funds that a military customer spends on its aircraft occur after
the original purchase date. As such, aftermarket supply chains must constantly
be prepared to deliver spare parts ranging in size from simple washers to
composite rotor blades. The best support structures succeed in this requirement,
and as a result, are able to capture long-term revenue while keeping the
customer satisfied.
This thesis examines the impact of volatility within the aftermarket parts supply
chain of The Boeing Company's military rotorcraft. The research is drawn from a
six month internship at the Mesa, Arizona site. This internship identified
inefficiencies within the support structure and built flexible solutions to mitigate
the effects of volatile forecasts, long lead times and multiple sources of supply.
This chapter will provide general information on The Boeing Company, its military
rotorcraft, recent trends and challenges within the defense aerospace industry
and Boeing's current situation with respect to the aftermarket supply chain. The
chapter will conclude with an outline for the thesis structure.
1.1 The Boeing Company
Perhaps the most recognizable name in the aerospace community, The Boeing
Company is the world's largest manufacturer of commercial and military aircraft.
Additionally, Boeing has a product line that includes helicopters, electronic
defense systems, spacecraft, rockets, missiles and communication systems.
This thesis explores the aftermarket supply chains of two of these platforms, the
AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter and the CH-47 Chinook Cargo Helicopter.
1.1.1 The AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter
Assembled by The Boeing Company in Mesa, Arizona, the AH-64 Apache is
commonly regarded as the most advanced multi-role combat helicopter in the
world. Since 1984, approximately 1,500 Apaches have been delivered to the
United States Army and the armed forces of 10 foreign nations ("Apache
Overview", 2006). Initially produced as the AH-64A Model, the Apache first
gained its lethal notoriety over the sands of Kuwait during Operation Desert
Shield / Desert Storm. In 1997, the AH-64D Model, or Apache Longbow, began
its fielding. This improved design incorporated advanced sensor, weapons, and
flight performance capabilities. Since then, the Longbow has continued to uphold
its namesake with combat service in Afghanistan and Iraq. Through continuing
service contracts with the U.S. Army and ever-increasing foreign military sales,
the need for efficiency in the Apache's parts supply chain has never been
greater.
Figure 1.1: AH-64A Apache (left) and AH-64D Apache Longbow (right)
("Apache Image Gallery", 2006)
1.1.2 The CH-47 Chinook Cargo Helicopter
Nicknamed "Big Windy," the Chinook is a multi-mission, heavy-lift transport
helicopter. Its primary mission is to move troops, artillery, ammunition, and
various supplies around the battlefield. Manufactured by the Boeing Company in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, CH-47s have been in service since 1962. Since its
introduction, approximately 1,200 Chinooks have been produced in five different
variations. From Vietnam to Iraq, the CH-47 is the longest running continual
production program at Boeing and has an anticipated service life beyond 2030.
Similar to the Apache, the demand for Chinooks is expanding beyond America's
military and the need for efficiency within its support structure is critical to its
continued mission success ("Chinook Overview", 2006).
Figure 1.2: CH-47D Chinook Cargo Helicopter ("Chinook Image Gallery", 2006)
1.2 The Defense Aerospace Industry: Post September 11, 2001
With the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the defense aerospace industry
underwent a tremendous upheaval. Army helicopters are flying at an operational
tempo far in excess of anything previously experienced. During combat
rotations, aircraft are flying as much as four times their peacetime average.
These continued deployments have raised four issues that the aerospace
industry was not fully prepared to deal with.
The first adversity involves demand forecasting. For over a decade, defense
contractors have compiled a historical database of peacetime part consumption.
However, with the armed forces fully engaged in combat operations around the
world, this information is no longer valid. The last major military operation
occurred during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This conflict only endured seven
months, providing little comparison to the present. With the "War on Terror"
exceeding its fifth year in September 2006, suppliers are struggling to predict the
needs of a wartime military. Ultimately, the challenge of accurately forecasting
the future parts demand has become even more complicated.
The second issue facing the defense aerospace industry is limited part
availability due to increased demand. This occurs for three reasons: battle
damage, increased flying, and exposure to harsh environmental conditions.
Battle damaged parts present the most difficult challenge. The reality of warfare
creates an unpredictable replacement requirement that includes all parts, at any
quantity and in various degrees of repair. The next demand problem arises
because aircraft components are reaching their design lifetimes much faster than
anticipated. This is a result of both the increased flying and the additional
stresses imposed on the airframe by the combat flight maneuvers employed. A
final cause under this topic results from the Army's continued operations in
remote climates. Whether it is the extreme desert heat or elevated mountain
altitudes, greater than traditional part failure rates from continuous exposure to
environmental conditions are beginning to appear. An example of this is seen in
a new type of corrosion damage from ingested sand into rotating components.
Regardless of which cause, numerous components are reaching mandatory
retirement much sooner than anticipated, driving demand higher than ever.
The third industry-wide issue is an insufficient supply base. There are an
extremely small number of suppliers who are qualified to manufacture
specialized aerospace components. This partially results from the fact that the
components are very specialized, the market is small in size and the government
imposes strict requirements on suppliers that requires extensive bookkeeping.
However, these suppliers are also reluctant to invest large amounts of capital in
capacity expansion. The suppliers realize that the fighting will eventually end,
and with it the wartime operational tempo that is driving demand. As a result,
competing aerospace contractors struggle to have their demands satisfied at
suppliers who are already operating at maximum capacity. Unfortunately, these
capacity constraints only serve to increase lead times and cost.
The final complexity facing the defense aerospace community is the availability
of certain raw materials. Known as the "Berry Amendment," Section 2533a, Title
10 of the United States Code imposes legal obstacles upon defense contractors.
The regulation states that certain, "products, components, or materials...must be
grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced wholly in the United States if they are
purchased with funds made available to the Department of Defense" (United
States, 2006). This list includes certain specialty metals which are essential to
military aviation for their high strength-to-weight ratios, corrosion resistance, and
thermal properties. Unfortunately, the combination of few domestic suppliers and
this procurement restriction often causes lead times for these raw materials to
exceed one year. Additionally, suppliers are forced to purchase these materials
at highly-elevated prices. In 2005, the price for titanium, one of the regulated
metals, surged over 317% (Toensmeier, 2006). Yet despite this cost, titanium is
a crucial material. In commercial grades, it possesses the same tensile strength
as steel, but is approximately half the weight (Kerrebrock, 1992). This regulation
undoubtedly is protecting the jobs of American specialty metal manufacturers;
however, it is simultaneously creating waste and inefficiency within every
defense contractor's supply chain.1
1.3 The Corpus Christi Army Depot
Funded and operated by the United States Government, the Corpus Christi Army
Depot (CCAD) is one of a few sites dedicated to repairing the 57 end-item
components of the Apache Helicopter and the 119 end-item components of the
Chinook Helicopter. An end-item is a major assembly such as transmission,
gearbox, pump or hydraulic actuator. Prior to Boeing assuming responsibility for
CCAD's supply chain, the depot was responsible for procuring over 7,000 unique
part types required to make the scheduled repairs to the above mentioned end-
items. However, because of the previously discussed challenges associated with
the current aerospace industry, the government's logistical system was unable to
adequately meet the Army's demands. As a result, CCAD reported repair
turnaround times (RTAT) in excess of twice the other repair sites. To solve this
problem, CCAD looked to Boeing as the original equipment manufacturer for
technical, engineering, and logistical support.
1 The thoughts behind the four industry-wide issues were discussed during numerous conversations with
David R. Greenwood (internship supervisor and Boeing Senior Manager in Supplier Management and
Procurement for the AH-64 CCAD program). The discussions occurred during June 2006.
In October 2004, Boeing signed a five year, several hundred million dollar
contract to partner with CCAD and assume control of the supply chain that
supports the overhaul and repair program for the AH-64 Apache and CH-47
Chinook. As such, Boeing became the primary vendor to CCAD for all AH-64
and CH-47 repair parts. Boeing was now responsible for establishing and I or
maintaining supplier relationships, ordering and purchasing the repair parts and
coordinating for shipment of the parts to the Boeing warehouse at CCAD. At the
warehouse, Boeing employees managed the repair parts inventory, issued the
parts when demanded by the CCAD production cycle and tracked consumption
data. Over the course of the last two years, Boeing has been creating and
refining the CCAD supply chain in an effort to reduce the RTAT and increase the
part availability.
1.4 Creation of the Supply Chain
After award of the contract, Boeing developed a plan for creation of the CCAD
support supply chain. The decision was to implement the following phased plan
(Thieven, 2004).
Phase 1: Provide technical, engineering, and logistics support services
and begin to create bills of material (BOMs) to define the
support material needed. A BOM lists the relationship between an
end-item and the parts that are used to construct the end-item. The
required quantities of each part are listed on the BOM.
Phase 2: Provide material support for the Apache's 24 and the
Chinook's 27 most demanded end-items and open the parts
warehouse.
Phase 3: Provide all remaining material support for the non-critical, lower
demanded end-items.
Phase 4: Provide material support for airframe structures. This includes
modifications for AH-64A to AH-64D transitions as well as repair for
battle or crash damage. A transition is an aircraft modernization.
An AH-64A model is delivered to the depot by the U.S. Army.
Older technology is replaced with newer versions to increase the
helicopter's capabilities. Examples of this include the addition of
a target acquisition and identification radar, stronger engines and
increased aircraft survivability equipment.
Since establishment of this phased plan, numerous changes have been made to
its architecture to include Phases 2a and 2b (expansions of the Phase 2 end-item
list). However, the original concept remains the same. At the time of this thesis,
Boeing is providing support to CCAD in accordance with Phase 3. Boeing has
begun planning for Phase 4 implementation. It should be noted that whenever
possible, Boeing has attempted to provide material support regardless of phase
assignment.
1.5 Thesis Outline
An introduction was offered in Chapter 1.0. Chapter 2.0 will discuss the current
support structure, information and material flow along the supply chain and
highlight the areas targeted for improvement. In Chapter 3.0, the flexibility added
by implementing a fixed pricing strategy is presented. Chapter 4.0 describes
how procurement lead times are reduced by altering the raw material
procurement policy. In Chapter 5.0, a methodology is created for identifying
inaccurate Depot Overhaul Factors in order to improve fulfillment rates. Finally,
Chapter 6.0 will finish the thesis with conclusions, observations and
recommendations for follow-on work.
2.0 Integration and Understanding
Before recommendations for improvement can be made, it is necessary to
understand how the current system operates. How do people communicate?
What is working well? What is not? This chapter will address these and other
basic questions in an attempt to explain why the areas chosen for improvement
were selected.
2.1 Information Flow
Efficient information flow is critical to a well-organized supply chain. The CCAD
support structure is no exception to this statement. In order for a repair part to
arrive at CCAD, numerous groups of people must communicate within a
complicated system that spans the entire United States. To manage the
thousands of information requirements, Boeing utilizes a centralized database
and a material management system known as the Advanced Manufacturing
Accounting and Production System (AMAPS). Understanding how people
interface with each other and the database will highlight where communication
inefficiencies occur and provide insight into where improvements can be made.
The figure below attempts to map the information network at a high level.
Greater detail will be explored in the following sections.
------- Supplier --------------------------
AL4
CCAD Price Quotes tLead Times
• , . .... . .... . II
Legend
S Information provided to database 4- One-way communication
4- - -" Two-way communication
Information retrieved from database
Figure 2.1: Communication Network
2.2 How Parts Arrive at CCAD
For parts to arrive at the Boeing Warehouse at CCAD, coordination and planning
must be completed prior to the production cycle. Once all of the preparation is
completed, the supply chain begins the physical process of ordering and shipping
the actual parts to CCAD. This chapter will describe both steps by referring to
Figure 2.1.
2.2.1 Initial Processes
Before a single part moves along the supply chain, a support contract is
negotiated between Boeing and the U.S. Government. Of all of the agreements
listed in the contract, three of the most commonly referred to are a part's support
date, its contract quantity, and its contract price. The support date is the date
that Boeing assumes responsibility for providing a part to CCAD. The support
date is linked to one of the four phases discussed in Chapter 1.4. The contract
quantity refers to the number of parts Boeing promises to provide CCAD once
the support date is reached. This quantity is based upon CCAD's forecasted
production needs. The contract price is a per-unit price Boeing agrees to charge
CCAD for each part. This price is based upon the contract quantity and an
agreed upon profit margin. An example of what this information would look like in
the contract is listed below.
Part Number Support Date 2007 Quantity Price
123 01/01/2005 25 $271.68
456 08/31/2007 3 $23.51
789 05/15/2008 0 n/a
Table 2.1: Contract Data Example
Thus, at of the time of this thesis, Boeing would already be supporting Part
Number 123. Boeing is required to provide 25 of Part Number 123 during 2007
and will sell each part to CCAD for $271.68.2 Part Number 456 is scheduled to
2 The contract will actually list each part number's requirements for the next three years. Each
part number will have a quantity and price associated with the future production year. Prices are
adjusted for inflation. Thus, for this example, the actual contract would list quantities and prices
for 2007, 2008 and 2009.
be supported on August 31, 2007. Depending on the lead time of the part,
Boeing will take the appropriate action to ensure the part is on hand by the
support date. Finally Part 789 is not supported yet. As such, none of these parts
are required for the 2007 production year. With the contract completed, parts
can be ordered for the upcoming production cycles.
2.2.2 Ordering and Shipping
Each April, the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), provides
Boeing with CCAD's Workload Forecast (WLF). AMCOM is the financial arm that
controls CCAD's budget. The WLF specifically details the number of overhauls
CCAD is funded to repair (per end-item) for the upcoming three years. The WLF
forecast is usually updated with changes on a semiannual basis in October.
Quite often, the WLF does not reflect what was listed in the contract quantity.
However, with the WLF on-hand, Boeing can determine the type and number of
parts to procure. This begins when the Boeing database pairs the WLF with an
estimate for the probability of part replacement. This replacement estimate is
required because not every end-item overhaul requires each internal part to be
replaced. If an inspection determines that a part is still functional, the part will be
cleaned and returned to service. Thus, a factor is used to forecast how many
parts will be consumed during each end-item overhaul. This replacement
estimate is known as the Depot Overhaul Factor and will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 2.5. But for now, for each part, the quantity to order can be
determined through the following equation.
End-item WLF * Depot Overhaul Factor = Quantity to Order (Equation 2.1)
For each of the 7,000 parts, the database calculates the quantity to order with
Equation 2.1 and transfers the information into AMAPS. Finally, the asset
managers, who are responsible for coordinating with the various suppliers,
retrieve the required quantity from AMAPS and work with the Boeing buyers to
purchase the parts required to support the WLF.
2.3 Process Timelines
With the flow of information and material mapped, the next step was to gauge the
timeliness of the operation. This could provide some insight into where
inefficiencies are creating waste within the supply chain. After talking to the
responsible parties, the following functional timeline for actual task completion
was developed.
Task Completion Times
* Maximum
* Minimum
0 2 4 6 8 10
Time (months)
Figure 2.2: Task Completion Timeline
Two functions are absent from this chart: Depot Overhaul Factor updates and
BOM updates. These were excluded because they are continually monitored
and sporadically changed. It should also be noted that the WLF update is at the
discretion of the U.S. Government and contract negotiations are beyond the
scope of this project. Regardless, closer examination of Figure 2.2 reveals some
interesting results.
When compared with the other functions, a "Request for Pricing" shows a
disproportional gap between the minimum and maximum task completion times.
According to SM&P personnel, this disparity occurs when numerous parts require
repricing at the same time. Recalling Chapter 2.2.1, when a part is placed on
contract, it is priced at a specific quantity. However, as mentioned before,
CCAD's WLF will quite often demand quantities that differ from those listed on
the contract. This volatility in the required quantity affects the price (as a result of
Request for Pricing (SM&P)
Ordering Parts (Asset Managers)
WLF Update (AMCOM)
Contract Negotiation
scale). For example, if CCAD originally contracted for 10 pieces and now
requires 100, the per-unit cost to Boeing will be less due to economies of scale.
Thus, the selling price of the part to CCAD will also decrease. Conversely,
decreases in quantities will result in increased procurement costs and selling
prices.
The problem inherent in the fixed contract price is revealed whenever a WLF
update arrives. This is because the update encompasses the entire parts list and
ranges in scale from -100% to greater than + 100% of the original forecasted
requirement. This change in the demanded quantities invalidates the quoted
contract price for thousands of parts. In addition, because the price is no longer
accurate, Boeing is prohibited from selling the part to the depot. The unfortunate
result is that even if the part is on the shelf and available for use by CCAD
personnel, Boeing cannot proceed with the sale. As a result, production must
wait while SM&P staff contacts the various suppliers and has new prices
calculated. Figure 2.3 depicts the most recent variability within the CCAD supply
chain as a result from WLF updates.
Figure 2.3: Supply Chain Variability in Demand
Figure 2.3 shows magnitude of the change in forecasted demand over a six
month period. Only 19% of the 7,000 parts had little to no change in forecast
(-5% to +5%). Unfortunately, the remaining 81% of parts experienced significant
changes.
While the actual task of submitting a new request for pricing can be completed
quickly, suppliers will often take exhaustingly long times to return new quotes.
This usually occurs because thousands of parts require repricing at the same
time. This delay in acquisition time produces two unfavorable results. First, if an
alternate source of supply is available, CCAD will attempt to purchase the part
elsewhere. 3 Second, if no alternate source of procurement is available,
3 By contract, CCAD must purchase the parts from Boeing is they are already supported. However, if the
required part is not on-hand, CCAD may look to other suppliers for support. Examples of this include
other Department of Defense warehouses and other suppliers.
production will stop. Regardless of the result, Boeing loses revenue from the
missed sale opportunity and customer satisfaction decreases. This
administrative repricing delay has significant consequences on the production
cycle and can be listed as a cause of the less than optimal RTAT. As a result,
this is an ideal area for improvement and will be discussed in detail in Chapter
3.0.
2.4 Implications of Variation on Lead times
The supply chain demand variability depicted in Figure 2.3 showed that
approximately 60% of the part numbers increased in quantity. Unfortunately, the
majority of parts that Boeing supplies to CCAD do not possess short lead times.
For the purpose of this analysis, a long lead time is defined as greater than or
equal to six months. Figure 2.4 shows that approximately 59% of all CCAD parts
have long lead times.
Lead Time Analysis
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Figure 2.4: Lead Time Analysis
Additionally, some of the most critical parts to CCAD's production fall on this long
lead time list. Critical parts are defined as those required for "flight safety"
purposes, those without which all production will stop or of those significant
importance to CCAD and the U.S. Army. Regrettably, many of these critical long
lead time items also experience the increased variability seen in Figure 2.3.
However, what Figure 2.4 fails to depict is the specific impact of raw material
procurement on a part's total lead time. When raw material lead times are
examined, only 66 of the approximate 7,000 parts had four similar qualities.
These qualities were (1) total lead times in excess of 12 months, (2) a history of
the previously described variability in demand, (3) on CCAD's critical demand list
and (4) composed of specialty metal raw materials.
a0
Recalling Chapter 1.3, specialty metal raw materials are difficult to obtain quickly.
When looking at this subset of 66 parts, the average lead time to procure the
required raw materials equates to 62% of an end-item's total lead time. The
corresponding range in raw material lead time spans from 31% to 88%. As such,
a theory was developed that stated if the raw material for a critical end-item was
available whenever an unforecasted demand was received, the total lead time to
produce the end item could be reduced by the raw material procurement time.
As a factor of the importance of these parts, Boeing management (with input
from CCAD) decided to focus on increasing the fill rate of these 66 parts. An
analysis was created to determine if there was a business case to justify
maintaining a safety stock of specialty raw materials for the 66 critical end-items.
Furthermore, if the safety stock should be procured, what quantity should be
maintained? These questions served as the second area for improvement and
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.0.
2.5 The Depot Overhaul Factor
Briefly mentioned in Chapter 2.2.2, the Depot Overhaul Factor (DOF) is an
average component part failure rate that Boeing uses to help forecast the future
parts demand. For every part on each end-item, Boeing determined a DOF.
Boeing defines the DOF as the quantity of a specific part consumed per 100
overhauls. It is important to stress that a DOF is unique to each end-item. Thus,
a part will have a DOF for every end-item in which it appears. However, if a part
is used in various locations within a single end-item, the assigned DOF will be
common to the part regardless of how it is used (Wart, 2006).
For example, "Gear XYZ" is utilized within two end-items: the fuel transfer valve
and the auxiliary power unit (APU) shut-off valve. Within the fuel transfer valve,
"Gear XYZ" has a DOF of three, while in the APU shut-off valve; it has a DOF of
five. Thus, on average, Boeing anticipates having to replace "Gear XYZ" three
out of 100 times in the first case and five out of 100 times in the latter. Utilizing
Equation 2.1, if the WLF for the fuel transfer valve is 200 and there is only one
"Gear XYZ" per valve, Boeing will order six gears in anticipation of the production
year.
The DOF selection is based upon input from a variety of sources. These sources
include (but are not limited to) CCAD historical records, engineering
specifications, human input and other program recommendations. Unfortunately,
the various sources rarely agree upon what the DOF should be. As such, a
prioritization scheme was established to choose the appropriate DOF. However,
these disagreements have recently caused Boeing management to question the
accuracy of the DOF list. As a result, an analysis was created to determine the
appropriate selection criteria and usage of the DOF. The third and final aspect of
this thesis evolved from this analysis. With a database of thousands of DOF
values, a methodology would need to be created to highlight potential focus
areas. This methodology along with the associated problems and limitations of
the current DOF usage will be discussed in Chapter 5.0.
3.0 Exploring Fixed Unit Pricing
Whenever possible, Boeing and AMCOM personnel will meet face-to-face to
discuss issues affecting the operation of the CCAD supply chain. During these
coordination meetings, new ideas are proposed in attempts to improve upon any
identified problems. In July 2006, one of these meetings took place where an
idea was suggested to address the timing problem caused by an updated
forecast and the need to reprice parts. The idea was to fix the contract sale price
of a part as a constant, regardless of the quantity ordered. In other words, once
the part was priced for a certain quantity, the quoted contract value would remain
the selling price regardless of what quantity was sold to CCAD. 4 Recalling Table
2.1, Part 123 was priced at $271.68 for a quantity of 25. Under this plan, the
$271.68 selling price would apply if CCAD only ordered 11 or 1100.
This idea, which became known as the "fixed pricing" solution, would mitigate the
effects of the government's poor and variable forecast by eliminating the need to
obtain a new price quote. Without the repricing delay, a part could be sold upon
request and the supply chain could eliminate inefficient delays. However, fixed
pricing would require Boeing to assume two types of risk from the downside of
this pricing solution. These risks are discussed in the following chapters and are
the starting point for an analysis to determine if the fixed pricing idea is an
acceptable solution.
4 The contract selling price was only valid for the specified production year.
3.1 Risk Due to Quantity Fluctuation
The first hazard with fixed unit pricing is classified as risk due to quantity
fluctuation. As discussed earlier, contract prices are based upon a specific
quantity. Assuming economies of scale hold true, the more parts ordered, the
smaller the per-unit cost. This affect occurs because the fixed costs of
production are now dispersed over an increasing number of units. The quantity
fluctuation risk becomes relevant when Boeing prices a part for one quantity and
CCAD orders significantly less. Figure 3.1 below depicts an example of this
issue.
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Figure 3.1: Quantity Fluctuation Risk
Assume the contract price is represented by Point "A." Here, a quantity of 40
parts equals a cost of $2200 per unit. However, if CCAD alters their demand to
Point "B," the new quantity of ten parts has a higher unit cost of $2700. For this
example, a fixed price agreement will cause Boeing to lose $500 per part.
3.2 Risk Due to Material Escalation
The second type of risk generally results from raw material costs. As mentioned
during the industry overview, certain specialty metals have tripled in price over
the last year. Without long-term price agreements with suppliers, material
escalation costs would likely be transferred onto Boeing. Once again, Boeing
would lose money in a fixed price scenario as they would be unable to transfer
these additional costs onto CCAD.
As an example, refer again to Part 123's contract quantity and price of 25 and
$271.68 (from Table 2.1), respectively. Assume that Part 123 is built entirely
from Titanium. If Titanium prices rise another 317% as in 2005, Part 123's
supplier will undoubtedly pass this additional cost onto Boeing. This would result
in a new unit cost of $861.23. Fixed unit pricing would require that Boeing lose
$589.55 per unit because they would still be forced to sell the part at the original
cost of $271.68.
3.3 Data Gathering
With an understanding of the risks involved, the research into fixed pricing could
begin. Responsible parties from the following functional groups involved in a
repricing assignment were interviewed: supplier management and procurement
(SM&P), asset managers and contracting personnel. It was during a discussion
with the asset managers that the first piece of information critical to the analysis
was found.
3.3.1 Discussions with the Asset Mangers
Recalling Chapter 2.2.2, asset managers are tasked to supervise and administer
Boeing's requirements with key suppliers. Specifically, asset managers
coordinate with suppliers to ensure that the requested parts arrive at CCAD to
support the production schedule. However, what Boeing failed to capitalize on
was that the asset managers also oversaw the parts flow to other assembly and
repair programs. Some of these other accounts include the production line,
aftermarket part sales direct to the military and other overhaul and repair
programs.
The asset managers would determine and load the purchase requirements for
the different programs separately. In turn, the buyers would react to these
requirements as they were loaded, by placing individual purchase orders. This
effectively eliminated the benefits of scale. As all of these parts support the
military, they are funded in the same fiscal year. Thus, the demand and
financing for these parts are known and available at the same time. There was
nothing preventing the asset managers from combining the demand, placing one
total order, leveraging economies of scale and achieving cost savings. A revision
of Figure 3.1 demonstrates this.
Figure 3.2: Leveraging Economies of Scale
If an asset manager purchases parts for Program A and Program B separately,
he would pay $2750 and $2500 per unit, respectively. However, if the asset
manager combines the two program's demands and places a single order
(represented by Point C), the per-unit cost is now $2250. Thus, the power of
economies of scale is revealed.
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3.3.2 Non-CCAD Demand for Parts
The next step was to determine the historical parts demand for programs other
than CCAD from 2003 through 2006. These years were selected because they
isolate the wartime demand. For all the parts that support CCAD, the yearly
demand for all the other programs was gathered. The data revealed that these
programs were different from CCAD in that when orders were placed, the
quantities rarely changed from the original forecast. These programs were not
experiencing the fluctuations in demand that CCAD was. Additionally, the other
programs provided significant demand (in terms of quantity) to justify exploration
into the benefits of economies of scale. This evidence provided the second key
to the fixed pricing analysis.
3.4 Data Analysis
In order to support CCAD with repair parts for both the AH-64 and CH-47, Boeing
must manage 7,000 unique part numbers. To make this list more manageable
and meet an October 2006 implementation goal, a subset of part numbers were
chosen for the analysis. Only parts that had an active support date and
possessed a unit price greater than $100 would be included. The $100 unit cost
cutoff was chosen for three reasons. First, Boeing purchases most parts under
$100 in bulk for a four year contract requirement. Second these parts represent
approximately 70% of the total part list. By purchasing these parts all at once,
numerous transactions can be eliminated and time can be saved. Finally, parts
less than $100 equate to only 5% of Boeing's total cost. This safety stock of
inventory increases fill rates at a minimal cost. By looking at the active support
dates and unit costs greater than $100, the resulting subset equaled 1,793 part
numbers and represented 94% of the contract's total revenue.
3.4.1 Risk Mitigation from Quantity Fluctuations
A part is protected against the risk from quantity fluctuation if its cost to Boeing
can not increase. Another way of stating this is that if a part is on contract for a
small quantity, it can be assumed that the cost to Boeing is already at its
maximum. This is true because of a practice commonly employed by Boeing's
suppliers. Known as quantity band pricing, a single price is applied to a range of
quantities in order to save time. These bands vary in quantity; however, the first
tier is frequently from the first unit to the tenth. Thus, the price of the first item is
the same as the price of the tenth.
In order to save time, suppliers will often limit their quantity band pricing to the
vicinity of the submitted contract quantity. Thus, for Part 123 from Table 2.1, the
price of $271.68 might apply for quantities 21 - 30 where a price of $250 might
apply to a range of 31 - 50. Figure 3.3 depicts this assumption by overlaying
typical quantity band pricing onto the cost curve from Figure 3.1. The bands are
applied across the entire cost curve to better illustrate the example. The figure
shows how the benefits of scale still exist, but not incrementally.
Cost Comparison
Figure 3.3: Cost Comparison
In looking solely at the economy of scale cost curve, quantity decreases where
the slope is steepest would have an enormous impact on the cost of an item.
However, in quantity band pricing, a decrease in quantity from nine to three (for
example) has no impact on cost to Boeing. This concept was applied to the
subset of part numbers in the fixed pricing analysis. As discussed above, the
assumption used was that contract quantities less than 10 were already priced at
their highest cost to Boeing. Figure 3.4 shows the results.
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Figure 3.4: Small Contract Quantities
These 945 part numbers represent 9% of the total contract revenue and 53% of
the subset of parts. Because these part numbers are on-contract for small
quantities, there is little risk associated with fixed pricing. Combined with the
small amount of revenue represented, quantity decreases for these 945 part
numbers will have minimal to zero effect to Boeing.
3.4.2 Revenue Implications of Fixed Unit Pricing
With 53% of the part numbers essentially protected from quantity fluctuations, the
question turned to how will the selected parts influence revenue under fixed unit
pricing. The 1,793 parts were examined using three filters: revenue potential,
contract quantity, and percentage of demand. Revenue potential represents the
amount each part number is expected to earn if the entire contract quantity is
sold. For example, if a part number's contract quantity is 10 and the contract
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price is $100, the revenue potential is equal to $1000. Contract quantity was
already discussed in Chapter 2.2.1. Demand percentage evaluates how much of
a part number's total demand belongs to CCAD and how much belongs to the
other assembly and repair programs. Two assumptions were used in this portion
of the analysis.
1. Part numbers with contract quantities greater than 10 represent an
increased risk for fixed pricing and the possibility to incur higher costs.
This is because quantities greater than 10 are outside of the minimum
quantity band price range.
2. If CCAD's share of a part number's total demand across all programs is
greater than 50%, the part number is exposed to increased risk from
quantity fluctuations and higher costs. This was based on the information
discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.
Figure 3.5 below depicts the results of this analysis. It should be noted that the
quantities represented under each revenue column are inclusive and represent a
minimum level of revenue potential. Thus, a part number included under the
$1M column is also included in the $750k, $500k, $250k and $100k potential
revenue earning columns.
Contract Revenue Sensitivity
Figure 3.5: Contract Revenue Sensitivity
This figure displays categories of high revenue earning part numbers that have
the potential to vary greatly in quantity. For example, there are 88 part numbers
with a revenue potential of $250k. Of those 88 part numbers, 83 are on-contract
for a quantity greater then 10. This implies that if there is a decrease in the
quantity required by CCAD, Boeing would incur additional costs under a fixed
unit pricing strategy. Of those 83 part numbers, 69 have greater than 50% of
their total demand satisfied by CCAD. This implies that the majority of demand is
subject to the quantity fluctuation risk. This again indicates risk to Boeing under
fixed unit pricing. The shaded columns represent a request from Boeing
management for financial implications. (i.e., the 83 part numbers that have a
revenue potential of $250k and are on-contract for quantities greater than 10
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equate to 56% of the total contract revenue). As a result, the represented part
numbers are good candidates for removal from fixed pricing.
3.4.3 Recommended Exclusion List
Based upon guidance from Boeing management, a decision was made to
expand the revenue implication analysis, but only include revenue potential and
contract quantity. The CCAD demand filter was removed and the following
results were found.
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$210 99 94 59%
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Figure 3.6: Exclusion List Recommendation
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The table expands on the previous chart with the shaded cell representing the
recommendation to management for exclusion from fixed unit pricing. The 100
part numbers each have a potential contract revenue of $200k or greater and are
on contract for quantities greater than 10. By removing the associated 100 part
numbers, Boeing protects 60% of the contract's revenue potential from the risk
due to quantity fluctuation. As a footnote, management subsequently added an
additional 54 part numbers to the exclusion list due to high susceptibility for
material escalation risk. The 54 part numbers were linked to suppliers who
would not agree to long-term pricing agreements for protection against raw
material cost escalation.
With the 154 part exclusion list finalized, 7,044 parts would no longer need
repricing from changes in forecasts. However, before agreeing to the fixed
pricing strategy, Boeing requested the construction of a Monte Carlo simulation
to determine the impact on income from sales due to the effects of fixed pricing
on the 7,044 parts.
3.5 Monte Carlo Simulation
A Monte Carlo simulation is a stochastic technique which randomly chooses
values for uncertain variables in order to estimate the probability of various
outcomes. Crystal Ball software (version 7.2.2) was used to construct the fixed
unit pricing simulation. The Crystal Ball software is a Microsoft® Excel-based
application distributed by Decisioneering, Inc for risk analysis and optimization
studies. The "high-level" flow diagram in Figure 3.7 will be referenced to explain
the architecture, assumptions, calculations, and processes employed in the
Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, the results from the simulation and from the
actual implementation will be discussed.
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Figure 3.7: Fixed Unit Pricing Monte Carlo Process Flow Chart
3.5.1 Monte Carlo Data Input
Construction of the model began with the input of the following data:
.... 
i
1. 176 end-items for both the AH-64 and CH-47.
2. WLF for each end-item.
3. 1,693 subset part numbers associated with the end-items (The 100
recommended exclusion parts were removed from the simulation.
The 54 additional parts removed from fixed pricing were already
filtered out by my initial screening of the 7,000 parts).
4. CCAD WLF for each part.
5. Non-CCAD annual demand (four-year historical average from 2003
through 2006) for each part.
6. Contract price associated with each part.
7. Contract quantity for each part.
This WLF data used was based upon 2007 requirements only. Additionally, if a
part was priced on either Phase IIA or Phase Ill contracts, the higher price was
utilized.
3.5.2 Assumptions
Probability Distribution
The first assumption made during the construction of the Monte Carlo Simulation
was how to replicate the variability within the WLF. Unfortunately, historical
variability within each end-item's WLF was not maintained past the previous six-
month update. Thus, a customized distribution could not be constructed.
However, SM&P managers were able to confirm that the most recent changes in
the WLF (depicted in Figure 2.3) were typical of historical trends. As a result, the
decision to use a Beta - Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT)
distribution was chosen.
The PERT manipulates the beta distribution and is similar to the commonly
known triangle distribution in that a minimum, mode, and maximum value are
known. However, the PERT distribution deemphasizes the minimum and
maximum values by replicating the distribution with a smooth curve. This
prevents skewing the results towards the extreme ends of the distribution. The
PERT also converts the mean of the distribution to be the average of the
minimum, maximum, and four times the mode. This once again removes the
bias of the distribution's tails and is a commonly used technique for procurement
studies (Roman, 1962).
As the current trend for variability within the WLF favors an increased demand,
the following parameters were chosen to generate the PERT distribution.
1. Minimum: -50% of the WLF
2. Mode: WLF
3. Maximum: +100% of the WLF
By comparing a revised Figure 2.3 with a PERT distribution graph generated by
the Crystal Ball software, a visual resemblance can be observed.
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Figure 3.8: PERT Distribution
Replicating Quantity Band Costs
Over the course of each trial, the Monte Carlo simulation has the potential to
demand any quantity within the -50% to +100% distribution. However, quantity
band costs were not available for each part. Additionally, inputting 1,693 quantity
band values would have been extremely time-consuming. As such, the
assumption was made to use a 90% log-linear experience curve to replicate the
cost of each part at any quantity. Essentially, every time a part's quantity
doubles, the cost of the part decreases by 10%. Argote, et al explain how within
industrial settings, an 80% experience curve is commonly observed as processes
are repeated (1990). However, a 90% curve was chosen to find a more
conservative solution.5 The equation used to construct the curve is listed below
("Cost Estimating," 2006).
5 The 90% cost / quantity curve is commonly used within the aerospace industry and is generally accepted
by the U.S. Government and their audit agency (the Defense Contract Audit Agency) as a reasonable curve
for determining cost with changing quantities.
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Y = CI * Xb (Equation 3.1)
Y = Cost of unit
C, = Theoretical cost of first unit
X = Number of unit produced
b = In(90%) / In(2)
The curve was developed by using the only known cost information: a part's
contract quantity and its associated price. Since the contract price is what
Boeing charges CCAD, the original cost was calculated by removing the
standard markup rate. For example, part "ABC" is listed on the contract at a
quantity of 20 and a unit price of $500. Assuming the standard markup rate is
10%, the cost of each part would equal $454.55 when 20 are ordered. This
information could then be substituted into the Equation 3.1 to construct a cost for
each trial's quantity.
While cost reduction through learning and cost reduction through quantity
discount purchasing occur for two separate reasons, an experience curve
"reflects the joint effects of learning, technological advances and scale" (Reis,
1991). To validate this assumption, a comparison from known quantity band cost
tables and the assumed experience curve was developed. The resulting figures
for two sample parts are listed below.
Part "ABC"
Figure 3.9: Experience Curve vs. Quantity Band Costs
The curves closely follow the quantity bands. However, there is a difference in
the magnitude of the costs. This can be explained by looking at the time frame
from which the data originated. The experience curve is based upon cost
estimates for 2007 using 2006 data. The quantity band curve is an estimate of
2007 costs from 2005 data. These changes in cost estimates could arise for
numerous reasons to include raw material escalation or increased labor costs at
the supplier. Regardless of the reason, the 90% curve follows the quantity
band's trend and is a reasonable approximation for cost.
3.5.3 Trial's Calculations and Process Flow
With the data collected and the assumptions made, the model was constructed.
Every time a trial is run, the model alters CCAD's original end-item WLF by a
random draw from the PERT distribution. All of the parts within each end-item
are changed accordingly and summed with the non-CCAD demand. The non-
CCAD demand never fluctuates as it represents demands which experience little
to no volatility. An example of these steps can be seen by using "Gearbox ABC"
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below. Three notional parts (001, 002 and 003) are used to build "Gearbox
ABC."
Gearbox "ABC" Original WLF 100
Trial Variation 1.2
Gearbox "ABC" Trial WLF 120
€ -1. PERT distribution varies demand.
Part Number CCAD Original Demand CCAD Trial Demand Non-CCAD Demand Total Trial Demand
001 8 10 19 29
002 10 12 34 46
003 37 45 41 86
2. CCAD part demand is varied equally. 3. CCAD Trial + NON-CCAD = Total
Figure 3.10: Demand Calculations
With the total demand for the trial known, the cost for procuring each part will be
calculated with the experience curve described in Chapter 3.5.2. This cost is
then used to determine the income from sales under both fixed pricing and the
traditional method of using a standard 10% markup rate. While the total demand
from the CCAD and the Non-CCAD programs is used to calculate the trial's
scaled cost, only the income from the sale of the CCAD demand is recorded.
The equations used and the example from Figure 3.10 are continued below. 6
Fixed Pricing Income = CCAD Demand * (Contract Price - Scaled Cost)
Markup Income = CCAD Demand * [(Markup % * Scaled Cost) - Scaled Cost]
(Equation 3.2)
(Equation 3.3)
6 The contract quantity and price would be retrieved from the contract. The contract cost was calculated by
removing the 10% markup rate.
Part Number Contract Quantit Contract Price Contract Cost
001 8 $ 1,000.00 $ 909.09
002 10 $ 100.00 $ 90.91
003 37 $ 500.00 $ 454.55
Part Number Total Demand Scaled Cost CCAD Demand Fixed Price Income MarkupIncome
001 29 $ 747.46 10 $ 2,525.35 $ 747.46
002 46 $ 72.09 12 $ 334.94 $ 86.51
003 86 $ 399.85 45 $ 4,506.67 $ 1,799.33
Example with Part 001:
Using Equation 3.1:
Using Equation 3.2:
Using Equation 3.3:
C, = e[LN($909.0 9 )- (LN(90 %)/ LN(2))*(LN(8))] = $1,247.03
Scaled Cost = $1,2 4 7 .0 3 *2 9 (LN(90%)/LN(2)) = $747.46
Fixed Price Income = (10) * ($1000 - $747.46) = $2,525.40
Markup Income = (10) * [(1.1 * $747.46) - $747.46] = $747.46
Figure 3.11: Cost and Income from Sales Calculations
For the example with Part 001, the fixed pricing method would yield $1,777.94
more in income from sales than the traditional markup method. However, this
financial increase is a result of both increased sales volume (two units) and lower
costs. Nonetheless, if the CCAD demand does not increase, but is held constant
at eight units while a scaled cost of 27 units (from the total demand) is calculated,
an increase in income from sales of $1,350.47 can still be achieved. This shows
the cost saving benefits derived from economies of scale.
3.5.4 Simulation Results
We ran the Monte Carlo simulation for 10,000 trials. After each trial, the
simulation recorded the difference between the fixed price income and the
standard markup income. At the conclusion of the simulation, the fixed price
income resulted in a mean increase of 11% over the standard markup income. A
histogram from the simulation's outcomes is presented below. The actual values
have been replaced with percentages for proprietary reasons.
Figure 3.12: Monte Carlo Simulation Results
The rise in the income from sales is dependant upon each end-item's ability to
increase to +100% of the original WLF. However, even if all of the end-items
were to simultaneously fall to -50% of their WLF, the income from sales would
still increase by 3%. Although statistically improbable, this event displays the
true benefit of cost reductions and the value of summing the demands from all
repair and overhaul programs.
Aside from the increase in income, the fixed pricing methodology provides
considerable advantages. Foremost, the repricing delay caused by the variations
in demand will be eliminated except for the 154 excluded parts. Recalling Figure
2.2, this can potentially remove six months from the procurement cycle.
Assuming the part is on-hand, a sale will occur as soon as the request is made.
This will also simplify the maintenance of the contract when CCAD requests parts
over-and-above the previously agreed upon quantity. Additionally, customer
satisfaction will increase due to the improved responsiveness. The increased
flexibility will have a positive impact on CCAD's repair turnaround times since
unforecasted parts will arrive much sooner. This will also decrease the holding
costs associated with keeping inventory on the warehouse shelves. Finally,
Boeing will stop losing sales to alternate sources of supply, further increasing its
revenue.
4.0 Raw Material Procurement Policy
The current raw material procurement policy contains two options. First, Boeing
purchases no raw material, but simply provides a parts order to the supplier. In
this scenario, the supplier is responsible for procuring all required raw material.
The total lead time for the part includes the raw material procurement lead time.
The second option is for Boeing to purchase the raw material and sell it to the
supplier. While not commonly employed, this alternative is used to assist smaller
manufacturers by delaying some of their initial costs. These suppliers can
instead focus their capital expenditures on operational requirements. In this
situation, Boeing purchases the required amount of raw material based upon
their parts forecasts.
However, when CCAD increases their parts order inside of delivery lead times
and Boeing is providing the raw material to the supplier, production eventually
stalls. Without additional raw material on-hand, the increased demands
consume the remaining inventory. In an effort to combat this volatility, Boeing
chose to explore the idea of purchasing a safety stock of raw materials for a
subset of 66 parts. These parts are characterized by lead times in excess of one
year, of critical importance to CCAD, have highly volatile demands and are
composed of specialty metals. This chapter will discuss the analysis used to
determine if maintaining a safety stock would be financially advisable and what
quantities, if any, should be procured.
4.1 Building for Flexibility: The Universal Model
At the beginning of the analysis, management communicated a desire to
construct a model that could be universally applied to all 66 parts. This "generic"
format would shorten the time required for the analysis and allow for the model's
continued use in the future. As such, the model would be required to examine
the impact of safety stock over a timeline that extended beyond a single year's
requirements. Since forecasts are completed in three year intervals and lead
times can stretch to over two years, a 36 month time horizon was chosen. The
"high-level" flow diagram in Figure 4.1 will be referenced to explain the
architecture, assumptions, calculations, and processes employed by the model.
Finally, the results from a Monte Carlo simulation will be discussed.
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In general terms, at the beginning of every program year, each part has a known
forecast. The appropriate raw material is procured in advance to manufacture
the part according to this requirement. However, every six months, AMCOM
updates the forecast. If the forecast increases (for parts with long lead times), a
manufacturer is left with two choices: (1) consume raw materials now that have
been allocated for future production and provide the increased demands or (2)
continue with the original production plan and ignore the additional requests.
The first choice will satisfy current demands, but fail to provide at a future date.
The second choice offers the same results, but falls short in the present.
However, if a safety stock of raw materials is available when the updated
forecast is received, a manufacturer can adjust its production cycle to supply the
additional parts demand. This simulation evaluates different safety stock policies
to determine the best solution for each part based upon lead times, cost of raw
materials, and income from part sales.
4.1.1 Data Collection
For each of the 66 parts, the following information was gathered.
1. Unit cost to Boeing
2. Markup rate for sales to CCAD
3. Raw material data
a. Type & description
b. Unit cost
c. Procurement lead time
d. Quantity of use per part
e. Minimum-buy quantities from raw material supplier
Cost estimates were gathered over the summer of 2006 and utilized escalation
factors to estimate future costs. The data was drawn from forecasts for the 2007
through 2009 program years.
4.1.2 Assumptions
Volatility between the Forecasted and Realized Demands
The model begins by assuming a level loading of production. Each of the 36
months has the same forecasted demand. This serves as a baseline for
measuring the possible variation that might occur when the simulation runs.
Additionally, a steady-state is assumed in that there is sufficient raw material on-
hand to complete a minimum of one year of forecasted demand. Whether exact
or safety stock levels of raw material exist at the beginning of each trial varies in
accordance with the ordering policy programmed into the model. The ordering
logic will be discussed in a later chapter.
The 66 parts included in this analysis experience the same volatility described in
the fixed pricing analysis from Chapter 3.0. As a result, the PERT distribution
discussed in Chapter 3.5.2 is once again employed. Each trial begins with the
simulation generating six values from the distribution, one for each semiannual
period. The semiannual variation is permitted to fluctuate between -50% to
+100% of the forecasted demand. The realized demands for each month are
altered according to the variation chosen for their six-month window.
Capacity
If a manufacturer is operating at or near maximum capacity, having a safety
stock of raw material would be irrelevant. Production would be constrained by
time or machine utilization, not the availability of raw materials. As a result, this
analysis assumes that capacity is not a limiting factor in production. This
statement can be justified for this situation in that the parts contained in this
analysis are given the highest attention. Asset managers set production priorities
with their respective suppliers in every attempt to guarantee that these critical
parts are produced when demanded. If time permits, suppliers will often alter
production plans in response to requests for changes in demand. This is due in
part to Boeing's efforts to develop strong relationships with their supply base and
to improve efficiency vertically along the entire chain. Thus, it is assumed for this
analysis that a six-month notice is sufficient time to adjust production plans and
that raw material availability is the only limiting factor in producing additional
parts.
4.1.3 Trial's Calculations and Process Flow
Classification of Raw Material
A model was constructed that classified the 66 parts in two ways: raw material
procurement lead time and the raw material's percent cost in respect to the part's
total cost. For example, if a part's cost was $1000 and the raw material's cost
was $100, the percent raw material cost would be 10%. The 66 parts were
consolidated into groups of similar classification. The breakdown was as follows.
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Raw MaterialFigure 4.2: Classification
On-hand Inventory Calculations
With the raw material classifications completed, the logistical and financial
influence of safety stock could be studied. Assuming a steady state at the
beginning of the simulation, the model pre-stocks the raw material inventory.
The initial value of the raw material on-hand (RMOH) is equal to one year's
forecasted demand plus the amount required by the safety stock (SS) policy.
The initial value of SS varies between 0% to +100% of the forecasted year's
requirements. The simulation begins as described in the "Volatility between the
Forecasted and Realized Demands" assumption. A trial demand is generated
and the appropriate amount of inventory is depleted from the RMOH. Depending
on the time period, the simulation would use one of the following equations.
Month 1: RMOH = Starting Raw Material Quantity - Month 1 Realized Demand
Months 2 - 36: RMOH = Previous Month's RMOH - Realized Demand + Deliveries Received
(Equation 4.1)
If the realized monthly demand exceeds the forecasted amount and there is
safety stock available, the demanded quantity of raw material will be consumed.
However, if there is an insufficient amount of RMOH, the model will consume as
much inventory as possible. Failure to provide raw material will result in a lost
sale. The possibility for backorders is not incorporated into the simulation. The
following example depicts this volatility for the first twelve months. The volatility
for the remaining 24 months would follow the same procedure. This example
evaluates the effect of a 45% SS policy on a raw material with a forecasted
monthly demand of 10 units and a procurement lead time of 12 months. The SS
column listed in the example is used as a reference. It only tracks the amount of
SS on-hand. Its quantity is included in the RMOH column.
Annual Forecasted Demand 120
SS Policy 45%
,Starting RMOH 174
1-6 1.3
7-12 0.8
} 1. Initial raw material calculated based upon SS policy.
2. PERT distribution varies demand.
I .J I 1i
2 10 1.3 13
3 10 1.3 13
4 10 1.3 13
5 10 1.3 13
6 10 1.3 13
7 10 0.8 8
8 10 0.8 8
9 10 0.8 8
10 10 0.8 8
11 10 0.8 8
12 10 0.8 8
3. Variation transferred to appropriate
months. Realized demand calculated.
I I
2 10 1.3 13 148 48
3 10 1.3 13 135 45
4 10 1.3 13 122 42
5 10 1.3 13 109 39
6 10 1.3 13 96 36
7 10 0.8 8 88 36
8 10 0.8 8 80 36
9 10 0.8 8 72 36
10 10 0.8 8 64 36
11 10 0.8 8 56 36
12 10 0.8 8 48 36
}}
4. SS is consumed by 3 per month.
Realized demand > forecast demand.
5. No effect on SS. Realized
demand < forecast demand.
Figure 4.3: On-hand Inventory Calculation
Ordering Decisions: Reorder Points
Once the impact of consumption on the RMOH is determined, the actual
inventory position must be evaluated before an ordering decision can be made.
The actual inventory position includes the RMOH and the "pipeline" inventory.
Pipeline inventory is defined as inventory that has been previously ordered, but
not yet arrived. The actual inventory position is then compared to the reorder
point (ROP) and a decision is made on whether additional inventory is required.
The simulation's ROP is based upon a continuous review policy that examines
the inventory posture at the conclusion of each month's consumption. The ROP
is calculated with the following equation.
ROP = (L)(AVG) + (z)(a)(/L) (Equation 4.2)
where L = Raw material lead time (months)
AVG = Average monthly demand
z Inverse standard normal cumulative of the service level
Service level = Probability that raw material will be on-hand when
needed.
aY Standard deviation of monthly demand
This ROP calculation assumes that if inventory is not on-hand when the order
arrives, it is lost. A service level of 98% was used in the model. Additionally, the
ROP assumes that holding and fixed costs occur for storing and ordering more
raw materials. The costs will be discussed later in the financial analysis (Simchi-
Levi et al, 2004).
Ordering Decisions: Required Quantity
With the ROP established, the next step was two-fold. First, the model would
determine if a replenishment order is required. If so, the simulation would then
calculate the quantity to procure. The following logic was employed to complete
these tasks.
Figure 4.4: Ordering Logic
Under a continuous review policy, the model will determine if the actual inventory
position is less than the ROP. If it is not, no action is taken and the model
continues to the next month. However, if an order is required, the model will
x 12]
x 12]
choose one of two options based upon the SS policy. If there is sufficient SS on-
hand or in the pipeline to return the SS level to 100% of the policy, the model will
order one year's annual forecasted demand. Otherwise, it will order the annual
forecasted demand plus additional safety stock to return the level to 100% of the
SS policy.
The example below is a continuation from Figure 4.3. It demonstrates how the
actual inventory position is evaluated and how the appropriate quantity is
determined in order to restore the SS to the 45% policy level (54 additional units).
When evaluating if the RMOH falls below the ROP, the model will not include the
SS quantity to determine the total inventory. Boeing management viewed the SS
inventory as insurance and did not wish to include its quantity into reordering
decisions. This provides additional security in that raw material will be ordered
sooner. The example is also extended to the 13 th month to display the effects of
delivered inventory.
ROP Calculation (Equation 4.2)
ROP = (L)(AVG) + (z)(o)(4L)
ROP = (12 months) * (10) + [NORMSINV(98%)] * (2.59) * (412)
ROP = 139 units
-6. RMOH falls below ROP
(161 - 51 = 110 and 110 <
139). An order is placed
for the forecasted annual
demand + what is required
to return SS to 100%.
Pipeline inventory is
recorded at Month 1.
7. Same event as Step 6.
8. Month l's order arrives.
Figure 4.5: Ordering Logic Calculation
After the above example is allowed to progress over the full 36 month timeline,
the benefits of utilizing this methodology for maintaining and ordering additional
raw material is revealed. In the following three charts, the effects of volatility on
inventory position and raw material consumed is compared between a policy that
maintains safety stock and one that does not.
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Figure 4.6: Inventory Policy Comparison
2 10 1.3 13 148 48 0 0 -
3 10 1.3 13 135 45 0 0 -
4 10 1.3 13 122 42 0 0 -
5 10 1.3 13 109 39 0 0 -
6 10 1.3 13 96 36 0 0 -
7 10 0.8 8 88 36 0 0 -
8 10 0.8 8 80 36 0 0 -
9 10 0.8 8 72 36 0 0
10 10 0.8 8 64 36 0 0
11 10 0.8 8 56 36 0 0 -
12 10 0.8 8 48 36 138 138
13 10 1.4 14 157 35 0 0 123
The demand comparison chart tracks the difference between what the forecasted
demand was and what the actual demand turned out to be. Whenever increases
in demand occurred, the safety stock policy expended its extra inventory to cover
the higher requirements. However, the non-safety stock policy was forced to
consume raw material that was reserved for future production. With the long
lead times experienced by this type of raw material, the end result for the non-
safety stock policy was an inability to provide 100% of the actual demand or an
inventory stock-out. This can be seen during months 12 and 31 of the Inventory
Consumption Comparison chart.
While the benefits of maintaining a safety stock are obvious from a fulfillment
position, the decision to hold extra inventory may not be financially sound.
Additional raw material costs extra money to procure, store, and manage. The
next step evaluates the safety stock policy for each of the 66 parts from a
business perspective and determines what quantity (if any) should be
maintained.
4.1.4 Financial Implications of Safety Stock
In order to determine the appropriate level of safety stock for each critical part,
two financial costs must be considered. These are the fixed cost for procuring the
additional raw material and the cost incurred for storing the raw material until it is
consumed. The fixed cost of each raw material is a known value. Once safety
stock is ordered, the model charges the appropriate fixed cost at the time of
delivery. Once safety stock is on-hand, a holding cost is incurred until all the
safety stock is depleted. An assumption of 20% of the raw material's cost was
used to quantify this annual holding cost. In order to translate the future costs
observed during months 2 - 36, all monetary values were discounted into present
value dollars with the following equation. An annual interest rate of 6% (0.005%
monthly) was used in the calculation. A single month constituted one time
period.
PV = FV / (1+r) n  (Equation 4.3)
where PV E Present value dollars
FV a Future value dollars
r = interest rate
n time period evaluated
The final financial consideration was to examine the income from part sales to
CCAD. To do so, we need to look at two intervals: 1) the cost incurred by Boeing
when the part was purchased from the supplier and 2) the revenue earned by
Boeing from the part's sale to CCAD. First, if Boeing provided the raw material
during periods of increased demand (used its safety stock); the cost of the raw
material was subtracted from the part's total cost. Otherwise, Boeing was
charged the full cost of the part. The following equations depict the cost
calculations from the sale of the parts.
Part Cost
* No raw material safety stock used (Actual monthly demand 5 Forecasted demand):
Cost = Quantity of parts sold * Part cost
* Some safety stock of raw material used (Actual monthly demand > Forecasted demand):
Cost = (Forecasted demand) * (Part cost) +
[(Total quantity sold - Forecasted demand) * (Part cost - Raw material cost)]
(Equation 4.4)
For example, assume a part normally costs Boeing $100 to purchase. If the raw
material cost of the part is $10 dollars and safety stock is used to produce
additional units, Boeing will only pay $90 for each additional unit. The following
example illustrates this cost breakdown.
Forecasted Quantity 10
Realized Quantity 12
Normal Part Cost to Boeing $100
Raw Material Cost $10
Safety Stock Part Cost to Boeing $90
Normal Part Cost to Boeing $100
Units Purchased 10
Subtotal $1,000
Safety Stock Part Cost to Boeing $90
Units Purchased 2
Subtotal
Total Cost
$180
$1,180
Figure 4.7: Raw Material Cost Example
The revenue calculation is self-explanatory and depicted below. It will use
whichever cost is applicable when determining the revenue.
Part Revenue
* Revenue = Quantity of parts sold * Part price (Equation 4.5)
The economic value of the safety stock would reveal itself if the revenue from
increased sales was greater than the costs incurred by procuring and storing the
extra raw material. The revenue from future sales was discounted into present
value dollars by the same method discussed in the cost analysis. The simulation
would conclude by finding the net present value (NPV) from the revenue and the
costs over the 36 month timeline. The assumption made was that the greater the
NPV of the safety stock policy, the more effective the policy. If the 0% safety
stock policy provided the greatest NPV, the determination made was that there
were no financial benefits achieved from procuring additional raw material.
4.2 Simulation Recommendations for Safety Stock
Recalling Figure 4.2, each classification of part was evaluated in the simulation.
The first trial conducted for each classification was at a 0% safety stock policy.
The NPV from stocking only to forecasted demand was recorded and used as a
source of comparison for the various safety stock policies. Each raw material
classification was then subjected to increasing safety stock policies, beginning
with 5% and increasing at 5% intervals to a 100% safety stock policy. Each
policy's NPV was recorded with the greatest value serving as the
recommendation. The consolidated results are depicted below with the shaded
cells highlighting safety stock recommendations.
3 25% 2 0%
5 1% 4 0%
5 10% 2 0%
5 18% 1 0%
5 70% 2 0%
7 2% 12 0%
7 10% 2 0%
7 25% 3 0%
7 58% 1 0%
8 70% 1 0%
9 35% 1 0%
12 1.5% 9 50%
12 3% 8 45%
12 5% 6 40%
12 16% 3 0%
13 15% 1 0%
15 3% 1 65%
15 20% 1 45%
17 25% 1 50%
17 35% 1 45%
17 68% 1 0%
19 2% 1 100%
4.8: Safety Stock Recommendation
The results are intuitive in nature. In situations where raw material was relatively
inexpensive and lead times were long, a safety stock quantity was
recommended. Essentially, the combination of lower cost and longer lead time
resulted in greater quantities of safety stock. However, when raw material costs
were higher or lead times shorter, no recommendation was made. By
purchasing the recommended additional raw material, an average of 61% of the
Figure
concerned parts' total lead times is reduced. The range in reduction is between
55% and 77% of the total procurement lead time.
After the recommendations were presented to management, further thought was
given to consolidating raw material purchasing across the Boeing Integrated
Defense Systems. This will allow Boeing to leverage its scale and reduce the
cost of the raw material further (similar to Fixed Pricing Analysis). While this
decision should be implemented for cost savings, its effects were not
incorporated into the previously discussed model. Reducing the cost of each raw
material would have a direct impact on the quantities recommended. When
future analysis is conducted on Boeing's safety stock policy, the effects of scale
should be incorporated. Examining the current recommendations, one could
assume that lower raw material costs would serve to increase the quantity of
safety stock selected. However, this can not be confirmed without a second
analysis.
4.3 Centralized Storage for Common Materials
A final recommendation with respect to consolidating raw material purchases
across the entire Integrated Defense Systems concerns how to store the
inventory. If Boeing can store raw material that is common to multiple programs
in one location, the benefits of physical centralization can be achieved. Stock
imbalances between locations would be eliminated by postponing delivery from
the centralized location until it was needed. This would prevent one location from
storing raw material that was not needed while another went without. The
benefits of centralized storage can be quantified through the commonly referred
to "square root law." This law states that the total inventory required to provide a
specified level of service increases by the square root of the number of locations
in which it is held. This can be mathematically expressed through the following
equation (Anupindi et al, 2006).
Isafety = Z * IN *O LTD (Equation 4.6)
where Isafety Safety inventory upon centralization
z Inverse standard normal cumulative of the service level
Service level E Probability that raw material will be on-hand when
needed.
N Number of locations without centralization
OLTD Standard deviation of lead time demand
Simply put, the more storage locations a business maintains, the more safety
stock is required. However, by reducing the number of locations from two to one,
this equation reveals that the total safety inventory required by the centralized
operation is reduced by 1/U2. Reducing an even greater number of locations
down to a single storage point will decrease the safety stock requirement more.
It should be noted that there are disadvantages to consolidation of raw material.
Foremost, by maintaining the safety stock of raw material at a centralized place,
the response rate and travel time to ship the material to the manufacturer must
be added to the lead time. Secondly, the shipping costs should be included in a
new analysis. For very heavy materials, long distance shipping will add
significant costs. Boeing should consider all of these factors in a future analysis.
5.0 Methodology for Identifying Poor Depot Overhaul Factors
As discussed in Chapter 2, the DOF plays a critical role in determining Boeing's
parts procurement. Recalling its definition, the DOF is an estimate of a part's
rate of failure. As such, it is understood that the DOF value will never be 100%
accurate. However, the DOF is expected to have a high degree of reliability.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. This chapter will explore the reasons behind
the current DOF problem and suggest a methodology for identifying inaccurate
values.
5.1 Disagreement Between Sources
For each part within each end-item, a DOF exists. The DOF is determined by a
prioritization process from six different sources. These sources are listed below
in order of precedence. For example, if a part has DOF recommendations from
sources two, three, and five; source two will be used.
1. Human Input from the CCAD Logistics Manager
2. Recent Review Recommendations
3. Three Year Moving Average of Historical Part Consumption
4. One Year (to date) Average of Historical Part Consumption
5. Asset Manager Recommendation
6. 4% Rule
Source one is generally a recommendation based upon a belief that a part
should be replaced due to a safety issue. As this recommendation can only
come from one person, it is a rare occurrence. Source two represents the results
from a recent coordination meeting where numerous parts were evaluated in an
attempt to improve the respective DOF values. Sources three and four are
based upon historical parts consumption. Source five is developed by the asset
managers when parts are new or no historical information exists. Finally, source
six is used when there is no entry for a DOF. 7 The database calculates a 4%
recommendation based upon a mandatory replacement of all parts. For
example, if 100 transmissions were going to be overhauled and there was a bolt
without a DOF that appeared once in the transmission, the 4% recommendation
would generate a purchase order of four bolts. If the bolt appeared twice, the
recommendation would be eight.
The DOF is selected from the highest priority source, regardless of agreement
between the other inputs. Therefore, if the recent review states that the DOF for
a part is 10 while the three year and one year average both show that the DOF is
85, the DOF will be 10. A final note on the sources of input is that there are
rarely recommendations from more than two sources. As a result, there is no
basis of comparison between the various values. Consequently, it is difficult to
determine when a faulty DOF exists. Conversely, when there are multiple
7 Unfortunately, because the 4% rule is used when there is no usage history, it is possible that the 4%
Boeing procures might never be used. Further analysis should be conducted instead of defaulting to a 4%
purchase, especially for expensive parts.
sources of input, there is a high degree of variation between the
recommendations. The following two charts depict these problems.
Variation in DOF Sources
4% Rule < 20% (2 21% to 51% to > 100%
(Can't or More 50% 100%
Vary) Sources)
Variation
Figure 5.1: DOF Source Analysis
Examining the data behind Figure 5.1, 92% of the parts have two or fewer DOF
sources. Excluding the parts that have only one DOF source or a value of zero,
40% of the parts have greater than 50% volatility in their DOF recommendations.
This allows us to conclude that potential exists for a high degree of error in the
DOF sources. Volatility for this analysis was calculated with the following
equations.
DOF Sources
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DOF Range = Maximum Recommended DOF - Minimum Recommended DOF
Volatility = DOF Range / DOF (Equation 5.1)
For example, Part 123's volatility could be calculated by assuming the following
information.
Part 123 DOF Recommendations
Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6
- 40 20 - 30
Current DOF 40
Max Recommendation 40
Min Recommendation 20
Range 20
Volatility 50%
Figure
Highest priority (Source 2)
-Max - Min
* -Range / Current DOF
5.2: DOF Volatility Calculation
5.2 Identifying Focus Areas
With thousands of parts requiring verification, a methodology was developed for
identifying which parts needed urgent attention. Four areas were identified to
filter out the most demanding parts: volatility in DOF sources, price, lead time
and backorder status. These filters can be generalized as uncertainty, parts that
are of importance to Boeing and parts that are of importance to CCAD.
As discussed above, DOF source volatility highlights areas where the potential
exists for flawed DOF values. Variation greater than 50% was chosen for the
analysis. Price is of significance to Boeing in two ways. First, too low of a DOF
for high value parts equates to larger amounts of lost revenue due to the inability
to sell additional parts. Oppositely, too high of a DOF for high value parts
equates to unsold inventory and losses from higher fixed and holding costs. High
value parts were defined as having unit prices greater than $100. Next, parts
with long lead times and low DOFs will result in a failure to provide the required
parts for production when inventory is depleted. The part's inability for fast
delivery will generate customer dissatisfaction when production is slowed or
halted. A long lead time was defined as greater than six months. Finally,
backordered parts show that this possibility is already occurring. Parts are
needed and are not on-hand. When these areas were evaluated, the following
information resulted.
DOF Source Variation by Price, Lead Time and
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Figure 5.3: Detailed DOF Analysis
5.3 Methodology Insights and Results
One additional column was added to Figure 5.3. On the far left, parts with high
variability arid low dollar value (less than $1 unit price) were depicted. If Boeing
simply applied the highest DOF source, regardless of where it fell within the
priority chain, it could assume that the respective parts would no longer have a
problem with DOFs. This conservative approach would only cost Boeing an
additional 0.01% of the contract value for a single production year of parts with a
DOF volatility between 51% - 100%. For parts with a DOF volatility greater than
100%, the annual extra cost equals 0.15% of the contract value. Of note is that
the top ten part numbers with each variability classification equate to 0.006% and
0.11% of the contract value, respectively. For perspective, Boeing has the
potential under this contract to earn an incentive bonus of up to several % of the
contract value for meeting RTAT improvement targets. Since improved material
availability is a large factor in RTAT, the increased cost is quite small relative to
the potential incentive bonus.
When the four filters are applied, the list of parts to evaluate is significantly
trimmed down. Reviewing part DOF recommendations is a tedious process.
There is no immediate fix. However, by beginning on the right-hand side of the
chart and moving left, parts with high volatility, on backorder, with long lead times
and high revenue value can be improved upon. The DOF is of crucial
importance to maintaining the production goals at CCAD. Immediate attention
should be given to improving upon those DOFs deemed inaccurate.
6.0 Conclusion
In this thesis, the impact of volatility within an aftermarket parts supply chain of
the defense aerospace industry was examined. Stochastic simulation techniques
were employed to demonstrate how leveraging economies of scale could achieve
cost savings while strategic selection of safety stock could provide insurance
against uncertainty. Both recommendations provided financially responsible
solutions that could allow for increased revenue even if the currently experienced
volatility continues.
Within the fixed pricing analysis, it is important to highlight that higher revenue
can result for two reasons: increased sales and I or decreased costs. Often, the
focus is on selling more parts to the customer. Yet in this instance, the Monte
Carlo simulation revealed that cost savings were the driving force to more
revenue. On average, an 11% increase in income from sales can be achieved
by combining the demands of all Boeing programs into one order. Additionally,
benefits are reaped by removing the administrative delays involved in repricing
thousands of items. Now, Boeing SM&P personnel can allocate their efforts to
more productive tasks. Part sales will also occur on demand instead of sitting on
the shelf waiting for repricing. For CCAD, the benefits of fixed pricing can be
seen in the mitigation of the government's instable forecasting. As a result,
CCAD gains increased responsiveness to WLF changes while the U.S.
Government no longer needs to expend resources to audit major contract
reproposals. Ultimately, the risk of production stoppage at CCAD due to part
unavailability is reduced. This can only lead to a decrease in the average repair
turnaround time.
The safety stock analysis provided more than a recommendation for additional
raw material procurement. While the results showed an average reduction in
total end-item lead time by 61%, Boeing's actions demonstrate a commitment to
the entire supply chain. Purchasing raw materials above and beyond what is
required shows the CCAD customer that Boeing is willing to spend its own
resources to protect against uncertainty. Likewise, Boeing is helping the smaller
suppliers by leveraging its purchasing size to keep costs lower. This cooperation
vertically along the supply chain can only help to improve its efficiency.
6.1 Observations
Creating and managing a supply chain is an extremely complex task. Countless
details and unforeseen difficulties must be planned for and overcome on a daily
basis. It is easy to appreciate how overwhelmed those who work to establish the
CCAD supply chain must feel. As an "outsider on the inside," it was obvious from
the first day of the internship that those who work to supply CCAD are extremely
dedicated to their jobs and steadfastly work to complete their assigned tasks
(Klein, 2004). Yet there appears to be a belief that the faster a task is completed,
the better. This idea might be an attempt to keep one's inbox from growing to
large, but it is a prevalent practice. While the fervor with which Boeing
employees complete their work is quite commendable, it unfortunately increases
the possibility of committing errors. If more time was dedicated to proofing and
reviewing submitted work, many mistakes that slip by unchecked could be
prevented. An example of this is the 14% of contract revenue dollars of "non or
slow-moving" inventory sitting in the CCAD warehouse.8 In the rush to develop
bills of material and Depot Overhaul Factors, errors were committed that resulted
in the purchase of inventory that was not needed. These errors are only being
discovered now, two years after-the-fact.
Although the principles of lean are most often associated with the manufacturing
floor, they can also be applied to the supply chain. The previous paragraph
describes many of the types of waste that lean thinking attempts to correct. The
excessive inventory at the warehouse coupled with the additional work required
to correct mistakes and reorder the required parts reveals that there is a
knowledge disconnect in the supply chain. Identifying these types of waste prior
to execution will prevent the negative financial impacts currently experienced and
allow the support structure to operate more efficiently (Pascal, 2002).
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work
The only thing certain about forecasts is that they will always be wrong.
However, the volatility experienced within the CCAD supply chain makes its
efficient management extremely difficult. Efforts should be made to improve the
8Inventory status was retrieved in November 2006. It is possible that some of the inventory was bulk-
ordered in anticipation of future year requirements. Yet, the bulk-ordered items only account for 1% of the
contract value. This is a very small percentage of the total contract value. However, when these items are
combined with the approximate 1,800 parts recently added-to or removed from the current BOMs, concern
should be raised.
forecasting tools used by Boeing and the U.S. Government. Specifically, the
DOF issues raised in Chapter 5.0 should be addressed. The suggested
methodology detailed by Figure 5.3 is a starting point in this task. With the most
significant parts identified, Boeing and CCAD can work together to improve the
replacement factors, and ultimately, the repair turnaround time.
Additionally, efforts should be made to educate employees on the statistical
importance of the DOF and how their actions might influence its value. During
various conversations over the internship, two practices were mentioned, that if
true, would directly corrupt the integrity of the DOF. While there was no proof
that these actions were occurring, the frequency of their suggestion raises
concerns.
The first of these "rumors" involved using the DOF as a tool to adjust inventory
levels. Raising or lowering the DOF to speed up or slow down the parts flow will
only degrade the accuracy of the true replacement factor. While this adjustment
might provide short-term fixes, it will also guarantee that the long-term health of
the supply chain is weakened. A more manageable short-term solution might be
to create a safety stock level for various parts.
The second "suggested practice" involved the individual requisition of parts for
insurance purposes. Stories were often told of how workers will withdraw as
many parts as possible in order to build personal inventories and protect against
future stock-outs. CCAD workers have learned that if they want a part with a
history of stocking-out, they should procure it from the warehouse whenever it is
available. An example of this occurred during a visit to the CCAD back-shop that
repairs rotor heads. A worker explained to me how during the process of an
overhaul, a certain part was needed to repair the rotor head. When the worker
went to withdraw the required items, he discovered that more were available.
The worker knew that he was going to perform another rotor head overhaul upon
completion of the current one. To make sure that he would have the available
parts, he requisitioned more than was presently needed. 9 This type of action
adds to the inefficiency of the supply chain, both in the present and for future
planning. A part sitting in a drawer cannot be used elsewhere on the shop floor,
however, it will still add to statistical consumption data. As a result, future
forecasting is affected because Boeing now believes more parts are needed on
average for a repair. In the present, inventory managers might also try and
expedite the delivery of parts farther up the supply chain because the inventory
levels are lower than anticipated. The practice of maintaining "invisible" parts
around the shop floor must be stopped in order for the true DOF to be found.
Lastly, collaboration and communication are vital to successful supply chains.
The best operating support structures realize this and attempt to share
information as often as possible. Knowledge of unforeseen events should
immediately traverse the supply chain. Only this way will a solution be found that
9 This discussion occurred between the author and an unnamed worker during a September 2006 tour of the
CCAD facility. The discussion involved daily operational procedures and how parts are requisitioned.
is in the best interest of all parties. As such, another area of emphasis for future
work should be on improving communication along the supply chain. Rapid
information flow will reduce the effects of volatility and improve the working
relationships between Boeing's suppliers, the CCAD supply chain and the U.S.
Government.
The suggestions made in this thesis combined with the recommendations for
future work will drastically reduce the impact of volatility within the CCAD
aftermarket parts supply chain. By concentrating on these areas, Boeing is
investing in the supply chain's continuous improvement and the partnership's
future success.
7.0 INDEX OF ACRONYMS
AH-64: Apache Attack Helicopter
AMCOM: Army Aviation and Missile Command
AMAPS: Advanced Manufacturing Accounting and Production System
APU: Auxiliary Power Unit
BOM: Bill of Material
CCAD: Corpus Christi Army Depot
CH-47: Chinook Cargo Helicopter
DoD: Department of Defense
DOF: Depot Overhaul Factor
LTD: Lead time demand
NPV: Net Present Value
PERT: Program Evaluation Review Technique
RMOH: Raw Material On-hand
ROP: Reorder Point
RTAT: Repair Turnaround Time
SM&P: Supplier Management and Procurement
SS: Safety Stock
WLF: Workload Forecast
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